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0.0 Abstract
The paper discusses various practical consequences of treating economics and finance as an 
inherently  dynamic  and  chaotic  system.  On  the  theoretical  side  this  looks  at  the  general 
applicability  of the market-making pricing approach to economics in general.  The paper also 
discuses the consequences of the endogenous creation of liquidity and the role of liquidity as a 
state variable. On the practical side, proposals are made for reducing chaotic behaviour in both 
housing markets and stock markets.
Contents
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Pricing in Finance and Economics
3.0 Liquidity
6.0 Dynamic Control of Housing Markets
7.0 Low frequency / Tobin Trading
9.0 Improving Continuous Double Auctions
10. Retail Savings Insurance
11. Conclusion
12. Acknowledgements
15. References
16. Figures
2
1.0 Introduction
“But  there  is  one  feature  in  particular  which  deserves  our  attention.  It  might  have  been  
supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge  
beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual  
left to himself. It happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and  
speculator  are  mainly  occupied  otherwise.  For  most  of  these  persons  are,  in  fact,  largely  
concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment  
over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short  
time ahead of the general public. They are concerned, not with what an investment is really  
worth to a man who buys it “for keeps”, but with what the market will value it at, under the  
influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence. Moreover, this behaviour is not the  
outcome of  a  wrong-headed  propensity.  It  is  an  inevitable  result  of  an  investment  market  
organised along the lines described. For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an investment of which  
you believe the prospective yield to justify a value of 30, if you also believe that the market will  
value it at 20 three months hence.
Thus the professional investor is forced to concern himself with the anticipation of impending  
changes, in the news or in the atmosphere, of the kind by which experience shows that the  
mass psychology of the market is most influenced. This is the inevitable result of investment  
markets organised with a view to so-called “liquidity”. Of the maxims of orthodox finance none,  
surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on  
the part of investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding of “liquid”  
securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a  
whole. The social object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and  
ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most skilled investment to-
day is “to beat the gun”, as the Americans so well express it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass  
the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow.
This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation a few months hence, rather  
than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years, does not even require  
gulls  amongst  the  public  to  feed  the  maws  of  the  professional;  -  it  can  be  played  by  
professionals amongst themselves. Nor is it necessary that anyone should keep his simple faith  
in the conventional basis of valuation having any genuine long-term validity. For it is, so to  
speak, a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical Chairs - a pastime in which he is victor who says  
Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passes the Old Maid to his neighbour before the game  
is over, who secures a chair for himself when the music stops. These games can be played with  
zest and enjoyment, though all the players know that it is the Old Maid which is circulating, or  
that when the music stops some of the players will find themselves unseated.”
JM Keynes [Keynes 1936]
This  paper  is  a  much  edited  extract  from  a  much  larger  paper  'Why  Money  Trickles  Up' 
(henceforth  YMTU) [Willis  2011].  In  YMTU the  author  introduced  a wide  ranging  modelling 
approach based on Lotka-Volterra  and general  Lotka-Volterra  models.  This  approach proved 
capable of explaining the power laws seen in wealth, income and company size distributions. It 
also produced an economic model that explained the split between returns to labour and capital.
More interestingly for the discussions in this paper, the commodity and macroeconomic models 
in  YMTU  demonstrated  that  there  could  be  substantial  differences  between  the  'prices'  of 
companies  and  commodities  based  on  expected  revenue  streams,  and  the  intrinsic  or 
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fundamental 'values' defined by input costs. The models demonstrated that this variation was 
inherent in the basic pricing system of capitalism as described by Minsky. The models are in fact  
simple and robust mathematical models of Minsky's qualitative descriptions.
This  paper  does  not  however  require  belief  in  the  modelling  of  YMTU,  it  simply  requires  a 
disbelief in the efficient market hypothesis. This paper simply requires that the reader believes 
economies  and  markets  are  inherently  dynamic,  chaotic  systems;  that  prices  can  become 
detached  from  fundamentals,  that  momentum  chasing  exists  and  that  investors  frequently 
estimate future results simply from historical trends.
The discussions in this paper are primarily the thoughts of a hands-on control engineer when 
faced with  a  dynamic,  chaotic  system.  It  consists  of  three  parts.  In  section  2.0  there  is  a 
discussion of pricing in finance and economics and the parallels between market microstructure 
and post-Keynesian pricing theory. In section 3.0  there is a review of recent research in liquidity 
and a discussion of the consequences of liquidity as a state variable in economics. In sections 
6.0, 7.0 and 9.0 some practical examples are given of how dynamic systems in economics and 
finance might be controlled. The first example in section 6.0 of controlling the housing market 
includes practical and sensible control measures. The examples in sections 7.0 and 9.0 look at 
stock markets  and are far more speculative.  It  is  however  hoped that these examples  may 
stimulate further debate on the effective control of chaotic markets.
(Nb the numbering of sections and figures in this paper partly follows the original numbering of 
'Why Money Trickles Up'.)
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2.0 Pricing in Finance and Economics
An interesting puzzle in the history of economic thought is why the mathematization of economic  
theory in the 1940s and 50s took place through the formalization of the static Walrasian model,  
rather than through the study of infinite horizon production based models that arise from the  
Classical view. This puzzle is particularly intriguing because the best mathematician who ever  
worked on economic problems, John von Neumann, introduced the key mathematical tools in a  
study of such a Classical,  infinite-horizon, production-based model before Arrow and Debreu  
used the same tools (mostly topological) to formalize Walras.
[Foley 1990]
The idea that  production rather  than exchange is  the  source of  value  is  contentious  within 
mainstream economics,  though  why  this  is  so  is  puzzling.  Both  the  theoretical  history  and 
empirical data support this central view of production.
The theoretical  debate goes  back at  least  to the work of  Sraffa and the Cambridge Capital 
Controversies. Sraffa’s work demonstrated that the production function approach of marginalism 
was not appropriate, and that pricing of produced commodities through the long period classical 
approach  was  the  appropriate  way  forward.  The  original  work  of  von  Neumann  was  also 
classically  based,  and also showed that  a coherent  system of  prices  can be built  using  the 
approaches of classical economics.
With regard to the clash between classical and neo-classical approaches, the work of Burgstaller 
[Burgstaller 1994] is particularly intriguing, in that he proposes that both the neoclassical and 
classical approaches can be presented as subsets of a unified approach.
In particular he shows that the neo-classical approach is appropriate when no labour is involved, 
as  for  example  in  a pure  exchange  process,  while  the introduction  of  labour  results  in  the 
necessity of a classical approach. Burgstaller’s work suggests that the neo-classical approach is 
only suitable for processes such as the purchase of raw materials and land, or interestingly, in 
the exchange of financial products.
In this light, marginalism would at first appear to be very useful in defining the mechanics of the 
purchase and sale of financial assets. With financial assets, owners have strong preferences for 
ownership, based on different preferences for risk, liquidity, etc. At a particular point in time, 
they will also have set initial endowments.
Following an exogenous event, such as an unexpected change in dividends, interest rates, etc, 
market participants will presumably want to rebalance their endowments to bring them into line 
with their preferences.
However, the financial field of market microstructure, with its wealth of data, has long moved on 
from simple static supply and demand curves.
Research  in  market  microstructure  has  shown  that  the  determinants  of  prices  are  stocks 
(inventories not shares), information, liquidity, etc, while marginality has been quietly sidelined. 
This is primarily caused by the problems of matching supply and demand over a time basis. 
When time is taken into account, marginality is replaced with a focus on inventories of financial 
assets owned, and the information encoded in order flow.
These conclusions on sources of costs are based on substantial quantitative research, supported 
by  some  very  interesting  theoretical  work.  This  work  is  well  reviewed  in  papers  by  Stoll,  
Madhavan and Biais et al, Stoll is a particularly good introduction [Stoll 2003, Madhavan 2000, 
Biais et al 2005].
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Lyons also discusses this with great clarity in ‘The Microstructure Approach to Exchange Rates’ 
[Lyons  2001].  In  sections  6.3  to  6.5  Lyons  captures  the  difference  between  the  ‘Tastes  & 
Technology’ approach of traditional economics and the ‘Information & Institutions’ approach of 
market-microstructure.  The  utility  approach  of  ‘tastes  &  technology’  rests  on  hypothetical 
foundations supposed in the late 19th century. The ‘information & institutions’ foundations are 
based on theoretical models proposed to fit large scale data sets through the finish of the 20 th 
century and the start of the 21st. As Lyons notes:  “The microstructure approach also includes  
utility maximization, but as we saw in chapter 4, utility is specified very simply, typically in term  
of terminal nominal wealth.”
Market microstructure has analysed two main forms of markets, those composed of continuous 
double  auctions  and those  made by  market  makers.  With  regard  to pricing  in  general,  the 
second is of particular interest.
Market  makers  buy  and  sell  shares  or  other  financial  assets  in  financial  markets.  Financial 
markets involve buying and selling things in a dynamic time frame. There is no guarantee that 
somebody will want to buy something at exactly the same time that someone else will want to 
sell something. Market makers keep markets working by ‘providing liquidity’ and ensuring that 
there is always somebody who is willing to buy and sell shares at any particular time.
Market makers make markets by acting as intermediaries and do not normally hold on to shares 
on a long-term basis. They make their living by maintaining a small margin between the prices at 
which they buy and sell. Market makers are normally obliged by market rules to post prices at all 
times, and are obliged to fulfil purchases and sales at their advertised prices. They normally have 
to do this while in competition with other market makers.  The speed of trading means that 
markets never formally ‘clear’ and market makers are often working ‘blind’ with little information 
other than the recent trading history of themselves and their competitors, and the knowledge of 
the level or inventory of assets that they currently have on their books.
Market makers make money by having a margin between the prices at which they sell and buy,  
this is known as the ‘bid-ask-spread’ or simply spread.
Market microstructure empirical research, experiments and theory have left the models of supply 
and demand behind; primarily because there is no evidence to suggest that market makers use 
marginality  in  pricing,  and  significant  evidence  that  other  factors  are  used  in  their  pricing 
strategies.
Research  suggests that the bid-ask spread is  made up of five main components,  these  are 
discussed briefly below, for a more detailed review see Stoll, Madhavan or Lyons.
The first type of cost is administrative or ‘handling’ costs and other overheads. These reflect the 
costs of renting offices, paying wages, running systems etc. For modern electronic share-dealing 
these costs are generally very small.
Another cost may be caused by non-competitive practices, such as industry standards on tick 
sizes or standardised bid-ask spreads.
A third source of cost is related to the cost of holding unwanted inventory. Market makers are 
like bookies at horse races. Bookies probably know the horses and jockeys far better than the 
punters, but they don’t make their money by betting on the horses. They make their money be 
balancing the supply and demand of the various betters, and making sure they take a small  
margin in the middle. It is dangerous for them to take a lot of bets on one horse, even if they 
think the horse will probably lose, because if it does win they will be wiped out. If they do get a 
lot of bets on one horse, even if they think the horse is lame, they will increase the price of that 
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horse (by decreasing its odds) and decrease the price of the other horses (by increasing the 
odds) until they bring their positions back in to line and ensure that they will make a small profit 
whichever horse wins. In the same way market makers also generally know their markets much 
better than their customers. But they do not normally wish to hold large positions in a single  
stock,  because  if  the  price  of  that  stock  should  collapse  unexpectedly  then  they  could  go 
bankrupt overnight. Because of this managing and hedging inventory can be a significant source 
of costs.
This leads on naturally to the fourth source of cost, the cost of ‘adverse information’. However 
well the market-maker knows his markets, he will never know them as well as ‘informed traders’, 
that is people who are closely linked or even working for the company whose shares are being 
traded, and so will have knowledge of good or bad news about the company before the market-
maker. These ‘informed traders’ are able to make money out of the market-maker, and for the 
market-makers  to  stay  in  business,  they  must  collectively  recoup  this  money  from  the 
‘uninformed traders’, they do this by having an appropriate extra margin in their bid-ask spreads.
A final source of costs is what is known as the ‘free option’ cost. In a well administered market,  
providers of liquidity are forced to hold their quotes open for a fixed minimum period. Priority 
rules then ensure that orders are closed out in a fair manner normally based firstly on price 
priority,  then on  time priority,  where  prices  are  equal.  These  rules  force  market-makers  to 
compete with each other and so protect the ordinary share-trading public.
One problem with this is that it forces the market-maker to hold his price for a fixed time period; 
in this time the market price may move, giving an advantage to a well informed customer who 
can make money out of this ‘free option’. To protect themselves, market makers add a small  
extra margin into the bid-ask spread.
As well as the work of pioneers in finance and economics covered in these papers, this area has 
also recently  been extensively  researched by others  from the field  of  econophysics  such as 
Farmer et al, Wyart et al and Bouchaud et al [Farmer et al 2005, Wyart et al 2008, Bouchaud et  
al 2009]. Taken together, the fields of market microstructure and econophysics seems close to 
providing full models for financial market functions that combine good theoretical underpinnings 
with good fits to actual data.
There also appears to be strong areas of similarity between the research that has been carried 
out in the area of market microstructure and that of post-Keynesian pricing theory. To the best 
of my knowledge these parallels do not appear to have been investigated.
Post-Keynesian pricing theory is primarily empirical,  and its empirical basis is of a depth and 
surety rarely found in economics. In ‘Post-Keynesian Price Theory’ [Lee 1999] Frederic Lee gives 
an excellent review of how far disconnected from reality is the marginal approach to the pricing 
of manufactures.  Despite  the book’s  title,  80% of the book provides  an excellent  review of 
extensive historical research showing how businesses actually carry out pricing policy.
The results of the research show that, in the real world of business, marginality is non-existent.  
In particular, most businesses have their maximum profitability at maximum output. Diminishing 
returns simply don’t appear in real world manufacturing. This has been clear for decades, see for 
example  [Eiteman & Guthrie  1952].  In  almost  all  production  processes  costs  decrease  with 
production right up to maximum output, and extra capacity, in the form of new factories, can be 
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added easily and speedily. Under these conditions; of decreasing returns to scale, marginality is 
irrelevant as it simply cannot work.
In the real world almost all companies carry out their pricing using some variation of an average 
cost and ‘mark-up’ basis, with standard additional costs being added to the prices of the inputs. 
It is important to note that, as with market makers; manufacturers and retailers also price their 
goods in advance of sale when supplying to the public. They also often do so on long-term 
defined contracts when supplying to other companies. It is also notable from the post-Keynesian 
research that manufacturers and retailers focus strongly on inventory levels and the prices of 
their competitors for their decisions on prices and production quantities.
The existence of mark-up pricing and controls based on inventory levels, along with the absence 
of diminishing returns, is strongly supportive of the classical economists’ point of view.
The parallels between post-Keynesian pricing theory and market microstructure theory are clear. 
Companies  are  obliged  to  behave  as  market  makers.  Complex  market  makers;  but  market 
makers none the less.
For a company, their  ‘mark-up’  is  directly  analogous to the ‘bid-ask spread’  of  the financial  
market-maker; though the weightings in the spread are a little different.
An easy example to follow is that of a retailer. A shop buys goods from manufacturers and sells 
the same goods on to the general  public.  So in  this  case the main inputs and outputs are 
identical;  in  the same manner as a financial  market maker.  While  overheads for a financial  
market-maker are very small, for the retailer they are much larger, and need to pay for the 
remaining inputs of staff wages, distribution costs, rental of shop space, services, advertising, 
etc. They also need to include for payment of profit on capital and interest on debt. But just like  
stock  markets,  prices  never  formally  ‘clear’,  and  pricing  is  based  on  information  from 
competitors, rates of sales turnover, and levels of inventories of goods held.
Manufacturers, or providers of services, follow exactly the same logic, but now the stocks bought 
and the stocks sold are of different goods, and the ‘bid-ask spread’ is  even larger and now 
includes the costs of the value adding processes used in production.
It appears that the substantial body of post-Keynesian empirical work could benefit strongly from 
looking at analytical ideas from market-microstructure and econophysics research.
Indeed  the  processes  of  market-making  and  market  microstructure  approaches  in  general 
appear to be ubiquitous and universally applicable in its role of price formation in economics as 
well as finance. Perry Mehrling provides a very thoughtful analysis of the US banking system 
using  market  microstructure  approaches,  while  Lyons  does  the  same  for  currency  trading 
[Mehrling 2010, Lyons 2001].
The processes described by market microstructure concentrate on order flow and spread. They 
arise from markets in which prices are dynamic and not formally settled, where prices ultimately 
are linked to long-term values, but public information on those values is usually not complete.
In  this  price  discovery  process,  information  is  found,  and  long-term  prices  are  defined  on 
different levels. Long-term prices will  ultimately link to fundamental values,  but as has been 
shown in YMTU, ‘correct prices’ will also vary with the point that has been reached in different 
cycles, on levels of liquidity and debt in the economy, on levels of government activity in the 
markets, on relative levels of trade and capital flows between different countries and levels of 
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inventories of financial assets in the portfolios of different investors. As described in section 8.2.2 
of YMTU, in such complex systems, the link to ‘fundamental’ values is weak and time dependent.
Market microstructure describes the mechanisms that allow buyers and sellers to discover these 
‘correct’  values. Moving to a focus on inventory levels means moving to a world of dynamic 
equilibrium, of Lotka-Volterra models, predators and prey and maximum entropy production. The 
work of Sraffa, von Neumann, Kurz & Salvadori, Burgstaller, etc give a very good starting point 
for the calculation of long term prices in such a world. Unfortunately the approach used by these 
authors remains one based on static processes and single period analyses. Recasting this work 
into a dynamic approach should be straightforward. A sensible way forward would seem to be by 
using the market microstructure, market maker / post-Keynesian approach to attack the single-
commodity, multiple-commodity, joint-production, etc, problems. If a simulation approach was 
used, rather than an algebraic approach, this might also reduce the ratio of headaches to results. 
One of the main reasons for market 'prices' moving away from fundamental 'values' is the role of 
liquidity. This is discussed in section 3.0.
3.0 Liquidity
Liquidity is a measure of how easy or difficult it is to buy and sell things. It has been shown in 
the macroeconomic models  of YMTU that liquidity can be artificially  generated in a financial 
system simply by the known short-termism of markets combined with standard financial pricing 
procedures.
Liquidity  has  been  the  subject  of  much  interesting  research  in  recent  years.  This  research 
suggests that liquidity could be of key importance in the apparent failure of markets to price 
assets correctly, and in the failure of financial markets in general. It does not appear that this  
research  has  so  far  made  much  impact  in  the  fields  of  economics,  finance  or,  with  rare 
exceptions, in econophysics, which I believe is unfortunate.
The  following  is  a  brief  review  of  current  research  and emerging  ideas  within  the  field  of 
liquidity. The discussion is largely confined to liquidity within stock markets and its effects on the 
pricing and trading of stocks and shares.
Both the definition and measurement of liquidity presents problems. Historically stock market 
liquidity has been defined as the ability to trade large quantities of shares quickly, at low cost 
and  with  minimal  price  impact.  Unfortunately  this  actually  describes  a  range  of  desirable 
outcomes rather than an underlying concept or property.
Similarly, measurements of liquidity may focus on trading quantity, trading speed, trading cost, 
volume of trade, etc. Historically it has not been clear whether these different measures were in 
fact measuring the same thing or not.
In  the  last  decade  a  number  of  papers  have  been  produced  giving  comparisons  of 
measurements of liquidity and illiquidity,  see for example: [Chordia et al 2000, Porter 2008, 
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Korajczyk & Sadka 2006, Goyenko et al  2009].  Many different  variables  have been used to 
measure liquidity including trading volume, frequency of shares traded, bid-ask spreads, order 
imbalances, amongst many, many others. The variety of measures used reflects the difficulty of 
pinning down exactly what liquidity is. As well as individual measures, composite measures have 
been created in an attempt to capture the multiple dimensions of liquidity. Indeed there seems 
to be something of a cottage industry in the creation of new measures of liquidity.
In the more recent papers such as those above, it appears that more sophisticated measures of 
the different dimensions of liquidity do in fact correlate closely. It also appears that annual and 
monthly, long time scale data, correlates well with daily data [Goyenko et al 2009]. These results 
appear to hold true for both stock markets as a whole and individual company shares.
The research above suggests that the different measures of liquidity are in fact measuring the 
same underlying  property,  however  the  exact  definition  of  this  underlying  property  remains 
elusive.
It appears that including liquidity risk as a factor may explain a number of prominent ‘market 
failures’. The following are given as examples:
Historically, domestic closed end funds have traded at a discount to the underlying shares, while 
international closed end funds have traded at a premium. These results can be explained by the 
greater liquidity of the domestic shares vis-à-vis the funds, and the less liquid foreign stock 
markets compared to the US fund share market [Amihud et al 2005 – 3.4.5].
Similarly,  in  most countries,  where  companies  have two classes of  shares for  nationals  and 
foreigners, the national owned shares trade at a lower price than foreign owned shares. In China 
the reverse is true. This appears to be a consequence of the high level of liquidity in the Chinese  
domestic stock market [Chen & Swan 2008], while in most countries the domestic market is less 
liquid than international markets.
Similar arguments can be used to explain the discounts on restricted stocks [Amihud et al 2005] 
as well as the differences between prices of treasury notes and treasury bills [Amihud et al 2005 
– 3.3.1] and also of treasury notes versus corporate bonds; where the price difference can not 
be accounted for by default risk alone [Amihud et al 2005 – 3.3.2].
Chordia et al, have demonstrated that liquidity problems can explain the post earnings drift that 
follows unexpectedly high or low earnings announcements [Chordia et al 2009]. While Korajczyk 
and  Sadka  show  that  liquidity  can  explain  up  to  half  the  benefits  of  momentum  strategy 
anomalies documented by Jegadeesh & Titman [Korajczyk & Sadka 2006].
To date I haven’t seen a paper discussing the anomalies of dual listed companies such as Royal  
Dutch Shell, however I confidently expect liquidity to explain the long-term diversion of such 
share prices.
While all the above are interesting, probably the most important result of recent research into 
liquidity, is that liquidity, or more correctly, liquidity risk appears to be a major component of 
asset pricing.
Amihud et al, give a full review of these results, which demonstrate that a liquidity augmented 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) gives much better results than a traditional CAPM [Amihud et 
al 2005 – 3.2.3]. Other work supporting this view has been carried out by Acharya & Pederson 
and Pastor & Stambaugh using single measures of liquidity [Acharya & Pedersen 2005, Pastor & 
Stambaugh 2003], Goyenko et al, Korajczyk and Sadka [Goyenko et al 2009], Liu [Liu 2006 & 
2009] and Lee [Lee 2005].
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Given the poor historical performance of the CAPM, the Fama-French three factor model has 
often been used as an alternative. This uses firm size and book-to-market ratio in addition to a 
market index. Results from the research above strongly suggest that a single liquidity measure 
can replace both firm size and book to market ratio and give improved results. This suggests that 
both firm size and book to market ratio may be surrogate measures for liquidity risk.
Fama and French’s own work indicated that as well as the factors of risk, firm size and book to 
market  ratio,  a  fourth  momentum factor  needs  to  be  included  to  fully  explain  share  price 
movements [Fama & French 1992]. If the research in liquidity stands up to further investigation, 
it suggests that share price movements can be explained by just risk, liquidity and momentum.
Further to that, and in line with the workings of the macroeconomic models of section 4 of 
YMTU, the work of Korajczyk and Sadka [Korajczyk & Sadka 2005] suggests that provision of  
liquidity also reinforces momentum strategies. This suggests that short term momentum pricing 
is not ‘behavioural’ or even plain stupidity, but is ‘rational’ behaviour for participants, until the 
market finally  reaches a position far out of equilibrium, and endogenous liquidity creation is 
stalled.
Taken together it appears that a new ‘three factor’ asset pricing model involving the market 
beta, liquidity risk, and momentum may be superior to both the CAPM and the Fama-French 
‘three factor’ model.
This then becomes much more significant at the level of the whole stockmarket, especially in the 
light of the extensive work by Shiller and Smithers regarding the long-term valuation of stock 
markets. This work is very well summed up in ‘Wall Street Revalued’ [Smithers 2009].
The central thesis of this work is straightforward. Shiller and Smithers find that stock market 
prices do not follow random walks, but are in fact mean reverting over decadal timescales. Two 
measures in particular are able to capture the over or under valuation of the stock market, the 
two measures that do this are CAPE and Tobin’s q.
Tobin’s  q is  of  course the same thing as the book-to-market ratio,  the same value used at 
company level in the research of French & Fama and various other researchers in liquidity. q is 
just the ratio of K to W in the models of YMTU.
At a whole stock market level, both company risk factors and company size are averaged out, 
leaving only book to market value as a meaningful indicator.
It appears that by measuring the value of Tobin’s q, researchers such as Shiller and Smithers 
have simply been measuring the liquidity of the whole stock market, with Tobin’s q acting as a 
close proxy measure for liquidity.
On the other hand the ‘CAPE’ is the ‘cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio’, which is simply  
the price to earnings ratio adjusted to a long time period; normally ten years. The CAPE also 
provides a very good measure of over/under valuation, and consequently correlates very closely 
with Tobin’s q.
Working backwards,  the  logical  conclusion  is  that  the  over-  or  under-valuation of  the stock 
market, defined by long term earnings and prices, is simply a measure of the overall liquidity in 
the stock market, and that deviations away from the long term average are almost wholly due to 
liquidity.
11
The  anecdotal  evidence  that  equity  prices  are  linked  to  liquidity  is  certainly  plausible.  The 
dramatic  fall  in  share  prices  during  the  2008  Credit  Crunch  and  the  subsequent  rebound 
following  the  introduction  of  quantitative  easing  and  other  fiscal  loosening  are  strongly 
suggestive of a direct link between liquidity in the economy as a whole and equity prices.
To date there appears to have been relatively little research in this area, which is unfortunate 
considering its potential importance.
Pepper & Oliver [Pepper & Oliver 2006] have produced an extensive study of this issue. Their  
work is very persuasive, and an excellent discussion of how liquidity works in practice, but the 
attempts to link share price levels to monetary data, while compelling, are not conclusive. This 
reflects the problems of finding trustworthy monetary data, a problem that the new approach 
using liquidity measures may alleviate.
More recently, Chordia et al, Jones, and Pastor & Stambaugh, have used different measures of 
market liquidity and have all noted correlations of liquidity to market movements. [Chordia et al 
2001a, Jones 2002, Pastor & Stambaugh 2003]. 
Liu has carried out a longer and more detailed analysis and concludes that there is evidence for  
changes in liquidity corresponding to market movements, and that this is consistent with the 
argument that liquidity is a state variable important for asset pricing [Liu 2006, 2009].
Chordia et al have carried out an empirical analysis of the relations between liquidity in the 
stock, bond and money markets, and suggest important links between liquidity, volatility, and 
monetary policy [Chordia et al 2005].
While it  is  early days, it appears that not only is  liquidity of fundamental importance in the 
pricing of stocks and other financial assets, it appears that it may in fact be a fundamental state  
variable of financial markets, and one that is straightforward to measure on a timely basis. If this  
is true, then there are some big implications for both finance and economics.
Historically, attempts to measure liquidity at a national level have focused on measurements of 
money supply.  Most notably in the UK in  the early  1980’s  monetary policy  was used in  an 
attempt  to  control  the  economy.  The  policy  was  quickly  discredited,  primarily  due  to  the 
difficulties of collecting timely and accurate monetary data, and also due to the ease with which 
the sources of such data could be manipulated by financial institutions, see Pepper & Oliver for 
more details.
In marked contrast, some of the liquidity measures used in more recent liquidity research, for 
example those of [Chordia et al, 2002 & 2005], are easily calculated on a daily basis from stock 
market information. It would be trivially easy for indices and sub-indices of liquidity to be set up 
that could be observed and used by both the financial markets and economic actors.
The research on liquidity suggests two implications for finance that are both quite profound, the 
first area relates to the pricing models based on Black-Scholes,  the second to the pricing of 
shares under the CAPM.
Almost all modern option pricing theory is based on the Black-Scholes model, or other closely-
related models. Black-Scholes has been one of the most important mathematical contributions to 
economics or finance, and certainly the only one to have come into widespread day to day use  
within the financial industry.
However, one of the core assumptions of B-S is that options on shares, as well as the underlying 
shares themselves, can be bought and sold easily in highly liquid markets.
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The recent body of work studying liquidity of financial assets suggests that this assumption is 
profoundly  flawed.  It  seems likely  that prices  of  both options and underlying  assets will  be 
affected significantly by liquidity. It also seems likely that the effects might not be the same for 
the option and the underlying. Consequently this would suggest that B-S models would, as a 
minimum, need modifying to take into account the effects of liquidity.
That liquidity should be a concern for quantitative finance in general seems obvious; Long Term 
Capital  Management  (LTCM) was  brought  to  earth  largely  through  trading  in  products  that 
became illiquid overnight, and illiquidity was a major factor in the collapse in asset prices that  
took place during the credit crunch.
Clearly the effect of liquidity on asset prices appears to be an area ripe for more quantitative 
analysis.  The  possibility  of  a  relationship  between  liquidity  and  volatility  seems  particularly 
interesting. Other than the work of Chordia et al [Chordia et al 2005] discussed above, there 
appears to be little published research in this area.
If it is true that liquidity is an easily measurable state variable of shares, and that also there are  
mathematical relationships between liquidity and volatility (which seems plausible), then it may 
be  that  measurement  of  liquidity  might  be  able  to  give  good  timely  measures  for  current 
volatility that can be used directly in Black-Scholes models; rather than the current practice of 
imputing from historical volatility.
A second significant area of interest for the application of liquidity in finance is to asset pricing 
models. The research to date suggest that liquidity can replace both the size and book to value 
elements  in  the  Fama-French three  factor  model,  leaving  only  risk  and liquidity,  along with 
momentum, as the determinants of equity prices. Or to put it another way, liquidity risk appears 
to be the main missing risk element of the various CAPM models. This knowledge gives the 
intriguing  possibility  that  it  should  be  possible  to  fully  hedge  an  asset  portfolio,  and,  more 
questionably, that this might even lead to self-stabilising markets in asset prices.
As discussed above, some of the liquidity measures are easily calculated on a daily basis from 
stock market information.
It would be trivially  easy to set  up a standard ‘liquidity  index’,  similar  to the VIX index for 
volatility, and encourage trading of futures in the index and so allow a deep market to form in  
this liquidity index.
Investors would then be able to go long on shares, or stock market indices, and simultaneously  
short the liquidity index to protect against a reduction or collapse in liquidity. If the recent work 
on liquidity is correct, this should give almost full protection on an asset portfolio of investments.
Interestingly, this should act in a strongly counter-cyclical manner. Given the mean reversion 
properties of the market as per Shiller and Smithers, liquidity protection of this type should be 
cheap at historical liquidity lows, but increasingly expensive as liquidity bubbles formed; if, of 
course, it was correctly priced.
If such hedging functioned correctly,  the cost of protecting against excessive liquidity would 
itself prevent excessive overpricing of assets and would automatically withdraw liquidity from the 
market as prices became frothy.
As well as having an overall liquidity index, there would also be scope for sub-indices tracking 
individual  sectors. Indeed it  may make sense to re-sort companies from traditional  ‘industry’ 
sectors into groupings that share a common pattern of historical liquidity and volatility behaviour.
Clearly correct pricing, and the formation of a sufficiently deep market to cover even a portion of 
the stocks traded might be problematic. There are also clear possibilities of counter-party default 
dangers of the sort that afflicted AIG following their substantial underpricing of CDS risk.
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If liquidity risk is the main missing factor in the CAPM model, and also it proves possible to 
enumerate and hedge against this risk, then by analysing the resultant data, it may be also be  
possible to analyse and quantify the remaining residual risks in the pricing of assets.
In an ideal world, under these circumstances, it seems possible that momentum trading would 
become difficult and short-term speculation might be a difficult and profitless activity. This could 
lead to financial investment becoming a predictable and rather dull area of both business and 
economics. Common sense, and the weight of history, does suggest that this is more likely to be 
a possibility rather than a probability.
However, if deep and efficient markets in liquidity futures did form, then speculative interest 
would allow liquidity index pricing to change in response to external factors such as government 
policy,  oil  shocks  and  other  exogenous  events.  This  leads  to  the  possibility  that  liquidity 
measures could also be very useful for macroeconomic control.
Having  liquidity  indices  of  this  form could  assist  governments  in  targeting  liquidity  in  stock 
markets, and in the economy in general. This might answer the problem of the poor quality and 
timeliness of traditional monetary data.
Casual  observation suggests that there is  poor short-term correlation between the supply of 
liquidity to financial markets and the health of the economy as a whole. In the United States for 
example, in 2005 and 2006 the stock market was booming, with very high liquidity, even though 
the economy as a whole was struggling (see also discussion of the Bowley squared model of 
section 4.9 of YMTU).
In such circumstances, central bankers face acute problems. With the single tool of interest  
rates, governments are in a cleft stick. This was admitted to recently by Kate Barker, an ex-
member of the UK monetary policy committee [Guardian 2010]. In 2005 the UK appeared to be 
in both a housing bubble and a stock market bubble, but the general economy was sluggish, and 
inflation was historically very low, with the threat of deflation in the wings. Raising interest rates  
to calm down the housing and financial markets risked initiating a recession, possibly moving 
into outright deflation.  However,  failing to raise  interest  rates caused an ongoing bubble to 
continue  its  expansion,  which  had  very  unfortunate  consequences  including  the  collapse  of 
Northern Rock, and the bailing out of Bradford & Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland and other 
institutions.
As discussed above, in the past, attempts have been made to control the economy through the 
control of the money supply. Historically these attempts have not worked well, partly because 
the money supply is difficult to quantify and measure reliably.
I believe a second problem is that there are two prime sources of liquidity. The money supply 
and debt is one of them, but the endogenous creation of liquidity within the pricing system, 
described in YMTU, is another, and in my view this is the prime source and the larger source. So, 
certainly increasing the money supply and debt can increase liquidity in the stock market. But 
increases in stock valuations also create their  own liquidity,  and also provide apparent extra 
wealth against which new debt can be secured. These two sources of extra liquidity feed on 
each other in a most unhealthy way.
I believe targeting a liquidity measure in stock markets may be more effective than monetary 
targeting, as a liquidity measure is measuring the output, the residual, of the liquidity creation 
process.  A  certain  amount  of  debt  and  new  money  supply  is  needed  in  an  economy.  If 
insufficient is supplied, then the stockmarket declines, if too much is provided the stockmarket 
booms, the stockmarket is  normally  a good weather  vane for liquidity  in the economy as a 
whole.
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The  macroeconomic  models  in  section  4  of  YMTU  suggest  that  liquidity  can  be  formed 
endogenously, in exactly the way proposed by Minsky. This suggests that, just as central banks 
are expected to control changes in the money supply caused by fractional reserve banking, it 
seems appropriate that they also be obliged to control money supply growth caused by Minskian 
asset price bubbles.
The recent research in liquidity, and the models of YMTU, suggest that liquidity needs to be 
targeted separately, in addition to the inflation targeting of the overall economy. The ease and 
timeliness  with which  liquidity  can be calculated,  and compared to historical  liquidity  levels, 
suggests that this would be relatively straightforward to do.
For instance it might be possible to use active management of the bond market as has recently  
been done under ‘quantitative easing’, on a regular basis to increase and decrease the liquidity 
of financial markets generally. So in 2005-06 it might have been sensible to actively embark on 
‘quantitative tightening’ to restrain the financial markets, while simultaneously lowering interest 
rates to assist the larger non-financial economy.
An important caveat here is the role of housing, which appears to be more important than even 
the stockmarket as a driver of booms and busts. Controlling liquidity and money supply for an 
economy will only be effective if the housing market is stabilised. Absent an effective measure of 
liquidity in the housing market, then other damping measures and long term indicators need to 
be used such as historical ratios of house prices to wages and ratios of mortgage payments to 
rents.
6.0 Dynamic Control of Housing Markets
Figure 6.3.1 here
Figure 6.3.1 above shows the prices of housing in the UK from 1953 to 2010, divided by the 
average wage, prepared using data from the Nationwide Building Society and the UK Office of 
National Statistics. The high house prices immediately following the Second World War were a 
consequence  of  substantial  loss  of  housing  during  the  war  and  a  suspension  of  house 
construction for the six-year duration of the war.
During the 1950s and 60s access to mortgages in the UK was tightly regulated and controlled by 
government micro-management of financial institutions, with direct lending ceilings imposed on 
banks and building societies; resulting in strict rules on eligibility, deposit sizes, etc.
During this period house prices showed remarkable stability at a cost of roughly 3.0 to 3.5 times 
average salary. It is very important to note that, despite the strong state controls on access to 
housing finance, the 50’s and 60’s were a time of substantial private house building in the UK. 
Despite  the restrictions  imposed by the state,  even at these regulated ‘low’  prices,  demand 
created lots of supply. As can be seen in figure 6.3.2 below UK private house building reached a 
prolonged peak in the mid 1960s.
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Figure 6.3.2
[ONS 2004]
Access to mortgages was liberalised in 1971 this resulted in the ‘Barber boom’, clear in figure 
6.3.1, stimulated by the resulting rise in liquidity. From the 1970’s onwards, the UK housing 
market has been characterised by vicious cyclic booms and busts, with a very clear reversion to 
the pre-Barber long-term trend at, 3 to 3.5, at the bottoms of the cycles.
These cycles are identical in form to the ones discussed in the commodity models of YMTU. It is 
important to note that at the bottom of both the actual housing data, and the commodities  
models,  prices  reach their  ‘real’,  ‘fundamental’,  Sraffian values.  At these prices  the value of 
housing represents the cost of the inputs. The same can also be seen clearly in data from the 
United States (this time deflated for cpi); see figure 6.3.3 below.
Figure 6.3.3 here
[Shiller 2010]
The persistence of these cycles is deep within the economy of the UK. In his book ‘Boom, Bust, 
House Prices, Banking and the Depression of 2010’ [Harrison 2005] shows that the cycles in the 
UK go back to at least the middle of the eighteenth century.
As an economic experiment, you could scarcely ask for clearer data output. The basic system 
dynamics are substantially and dramatically changed following a point change in policy in 1971. 
Not only that, but this experiment has controls; Germany and Switzerland for example, have 
retained strict controls on mortgages for house purchases and don’t suffer from strong cyclical 
booms and busts in house prices. Figure 6.3.4 below has the average value of house prices  
included for the two periods.
Figure 6.3.4 here
The net result of the liberalisation of credit in 1971 was the increase in average cost of housing 
for all Britons by roughly 23%. In the last cycle, from 1996 to 2010, prices were fully 40% 
higher than the ’55-’70 baseline rate.
Housing suffers from the same problem as capital-intensive commodities, as modelled in section 
3  of  YMTU.  Construction  of  housing  takes  a  finite  time,  and  so  house  prices  can  go  up 
significantly before market mechanisms have time to work. Unfortunately, housing also has the 
same problems of endogenous liquidity creation that is seen in the macroeconomic model of 
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YMTU. As house prices go up, people feel richer, and also as with shares ‘momentum’ kicks in, 
and house prices, and the economy as a whole keeps rising, until finally house prices become 
unaffordable  for  new entrants  in  the  market,  and  the  bubble  bursts.  As  a  capital-intensive 
industry, housing is naturally cyclical.
This again shows that the contrast between the comparative statics of neoclassical economics, 
and the real world of dynamic differential equations is stark. With comparative statics it is easy 
to ‘prove’ that credit controls and other government interventions ‘must’ increase the price of 
goods, and so reduce the welfare of the public.  So neoclassical  economists always push for 
removal of such controls.
In the real world, where speculative cycles can be endogenously created within the economic 
system; credit controls and other ‘interferences’ in the market work beneficially by ‘damping’ the 
cyclical behaviour. It may be counter-intuitive, but in the right circumstances, applying controls 
and apparent  ‘costs’  to  the  market  actually  reduces  the  price  of  goods.  And reduces  them 
substantially. In the area of UK housing, the data above shows that the reduction in prices would 
be over 20% if strict credit controls were reimposed tomorrow as they were in the ‘50s and ‘60s.
Going back to figure 6.3.1 or 6.3.3 for the UK and US it is clear that the ‘investment’ value of 
housing is a chimera. Over the long term, growth in the value of houses is derisory and barely 
keeps up with the growth in earnings. Stock market growth is typically 5% higher than this.
Smithers discusses the dual properties of housing as both a form of consumption and investment 
in  Wall  Street Revalued p 107-108 [Smithers  2009]. The fact  that housing is  fundamentally  
consumption is demonstrated by the continued reversion to a fixed proportion of wages.
Figures 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 show clearly that in the long-term housing is a proportion of wages, and 
behaves  as consumption. Governments  should treat it  as such, and actively  prevent  houses 
being  treated  as  investments,  and  most  certainly  should  prevent  them  being  treated  as 
speculative investments.
Looking both  at  the  UK data  and the  US data in  figures  6.3.1  and 6.3.3,  a  very  worrying  
development is that in both countries the size of the booms is steadily rising, though the falls  
back to normal are the same. From a controls point of view this is very worrying, it suggests that 
the cycles could be even more dramatic and dangerous in the future.
Faced with a dynamic,  cyclical  system, standard control  systems knowledge can be used to 
control the system. There are two ways to remove cycling (what engineers call ‘hunting’) in a 
control system.
One  is  to  use  deliberate  counter-cyclical  feedback;  most  central  banks  try  to  do  this  using 
interest rates to control the economy as a whole. As central bankers are only too aware, this is  
not an easy way to control anything. A good example of such a feedback loop is a domestic 
shower system. A combination of a difficult to use mixer valve, and the delay between making 
the  change  at  the  tap  and  feeling  the  change  in  the  water  temperature  often  results  in 
alternating flows of water that is too hot or too cold .
Wherever  possible,  a  much  better  solution  is  to  use  damping  of  the  cycle.  When  done 
successfully this can result in a dramatic drop in oscillations with fairly minor, adjustments to the 
system. This is like the example of using shock absorbers with a car’s wheels to prevent the car 
vibrating wildly on its springs every time it hits a bump.
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The strict credit controls used in the UK prior to 1971 provided just such an effective damping 
system. If all else fails it is imperative that such controls are reintroduced in the UK.
However it may be possible that less draconian measures may be just as effective.
As a rule of thumb, to be effective, damping measures need to have a time span of a similar  
order to that of the natural cycle time of the system, as a minimum they should be of a length of  
half a cycle or so. For the UK Harrison [Harrison 2005] shows strong evidence for a fifteen to 
twenty year cycle for house prices. Sensibly, damping measures need to be of the order of ten 
years or so.
Looking closely at the US data in figure 6.3.3; there is the same flat trend as the UK at the 
bottoms of the cycles; showing the same reversion to real, non-speculative, prices. It is also 
clear that the booms are a relatively new phenomenon.
A subtly different experiment has been carried out in the US. The change in behaviour of the 
housing  market  appears  to  be  correlated  with  the  rise  in  non-standard  mortgage products. 
Historically the US has used fixed-rate mortgages, only moving to adjustable rate mortgages 
comparatively recently. In the UK adjustable, or short term fixed mortgages have been the norm 
for many years, and it is very difficult to get fixed rate mortgages of more than five years.
The finance industry does not like fixed-rate mortgages. It leaves the issuers holding interest  
rate and inflation risk. Moving to adjustable rates gives the appearance of moving the risk to 
individual mortgage holders. This in itself is a practice to be questioned in a democratic society.  
Why sophisticated finance companies should be allowed to offload complex financial risk onto 
individuals with little mathematical, let alone financial, training is not clear.
In reality, offloading risk in systemic fashion like this simply creates systemic risk. As has been 
made abundantly clear in recent years; ultimately the only realistic holder of systemic risk is the 
taxpayer. Allowing financial companies to issue variable rate mortgages is to give the financial 
companies government subsidised one-way bets.
Figure 6.3.5 below gives a comparison of mortgage types issued in various different countries in 
Europe.
6.3.5 here
[Hess & Holzhausen 2008]
The mainly variable countries are Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland and the 
UK. This pretty much speaks for itself.
The  solution  to  this  is  trivially  straightforward.  All  loans  that  are  secured  against  domestic 
property should be limited to a ten-year minimum and a thirty year maximum. They should also  
be fixed rate, or, as a minimum, be a fixed percentage above rpi or cpi, throughout the period of  
the  mortgage.  This  would  move  interest  rate  risk  back  on  to  the  shoulders  of  the  finance 
industry.  Where  it  belongs.  Variable  rate  mortgages  should  be  strictly  illegal  in  any  self-
respecting democracy.
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There are other sensible mechanisms to reduce the use of houses as investments, especially as 
speculative  investments.  The most  obvious  one is  to  have a  capital  gains  tax  that  is  more 
punitive than that for other investments. The tax should be charged on all houses, including first 
homes, without exception. Sensibly this would be a tapered tax; starting at say 20% for the first 
year,  then  drop  by  two  percentage  points  per  year,  so  reaching  zero  after  ten  years  of 
ownership.
A much better approach would be to have a sales tax on all houses. This should be applied to 
the seller of all houses, whether they have increased or decreased in value. Again, sensibly, the 
tax should be tapered over the years.
A tapered capital-gains tax or house sales tax, with a ten-year taper should bring in the damping 
of the sort required to deal with a 15 to 20 year endogenous property cycle. People buying 
houses to live in would not be punished, speculators would be.
In addition annual property taxes, or land taxes, should be charged on the value of houses or on 
the value of the underlying land, rather than on the occupants, as many local taxes are. 
Another  sensible  policy  would be to have compulsory  mortgage indemnity  guarantee (MIG). 
House purchasers would be obliged to take out insurance to cover full potential losses against 
potential negative equity, ie the difference between mortgage loan value and likely sale value of 
house. Such insurance would be cheap if the purchaser had a large deposit and prices were 
below the long-term trend. The insurance would be very expensive if the deposit was small and 
it was the height of a boom. As such, compulsory MIG should act in a strongly counter-cyclical 
manner.
Many countries enforce minimum deposit requirements [Hess & Holzhausen 2008]. This seems a 
very sensible policy, as those with small deposits are far more likely to default, see for example 
figure 6.3.6 below.
6.3.6 here
[FT/S&P 2010]
It can be seen that arrears rates increase dramatically as deposit sizes reduce. As with variable 
rate mortgages, when governments allow financial institutions to offer low deposit rates; that is 
highly leveraged asset purchases, they allow financial institutions to offload their risk onto the 
state.
There is a more sophisticated and better way of addressing this particular risk problem. Rather 
than prescribe laws on deposits, a more effective law would define a maximum limit of say 80% 
of the sale value of a house that could be repaid to pay off debt secured on the property.
So if a homeowner was foreclosed on, and their property was sold off, a minimum of 20% of the 
sale proceeds would go to the homeowner,  and the other 80% would be shared by all  the 
creditors who have loans secured on the property. This would have a number of advantages. It 
would have the same effect as a minimum deposit requirement of 20%. Banks would generally  
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be reluctant to supply a mortgage of greater than 80% of the value of the house. It would also  
make it much more difficult to evade the minimum deposit rules by taking out secondary loans 
secured on the house.
More subtly it would also act in a counter-cyclical manner. When house prices were at historical  
lows, banks might be willing to lend 90% mortgages, confident that house price were likely to 
rise.  Conversely,  when house prices were significantly  above their  long-term averages banks 
would require larger and larger deposits due to their fears that house prices might drop in the 
future. Similarly they would be very reluctant to allow mortgage equity withdrawal.
 
In addition to the passive management techniques discussed above, there is also a strong case 
for active counter-cyclical monitoring and management of the economy by central banks and 
other monetary authorities. Despite protestations to the opposite, housing bubbles are very easy 
to spot.
The first obvious measure is that shown in figures 6.3.1 and 6.3.3 for the US and UK. The ratio  
of house prices to median wages shows very strong patterns of reversion to mean.
Similar patterns are also seen in ratios of housing costs to rental costs. When house prices are 
correctly  valued,  housing  costs  (mortgage  payments,  etc)  are  close  to  rents  on  equivalent 
properties [FT 2010].
If either of these ratios increases significantly above the long-term trend then you are moving 
into a housing bubble.
At this point the central bank should intervene to prick the bubble as early as possible. This 
could be by increasing the sales tax or capital gains tax on houses, increasing deposit and MIG 
requirements or by imposing a tax on mortgage debt.
Finally, if none of the above work effectively to damp markets then the necessary solution is to 
simply bring back the same credit controls that the UK had prior to 1971.
7.0 Low Frequency / Tobin Trading
THE spectacular collapse of so many big financial firms during the crisis of 2008 has provided  
new  evidence  for  the  belief  that  stockmarket  capitalism  is  dangerously  short-termist………
Shareholders can no longer with a straight face cite the efficient-market hypothesis as evidence  
that rising share prices are always evidence of better prospects, rather than of an unsustainable  
bubble.
If the stockmarket can get wildly out of whack in the short run, companies and investors that  
base their decisions solely on passing movements in share prices should not be surprised if they  
pay  a  penalty  over  the  long  term.  But  what  can  be  done  to  encourage  a  longer-term  
perspective?……
In the early 1980s shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange changed hands every three  
years on average. Nowadays the average tenure is down to about ten months. That helps to  
explain the growing concern about short-termism. Last year a task force of doughty American  
investors (Warren Buffett, Felix Rohatyn and Pete Peterson, among others) convened by the  
Aspen  Institute,  a  think-tank,  published  a  report  called  “Overcoming  Short-Termism”.  It  
advocated  various  measures  to  encourage  investors  to  hold  shares  for  longer,  including  
withholding voting rights from new shareholders for a year. [Economist 2010a]
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Warren Buffet is of course a value investor, the sort of investor who intuitively understands the 
workings of the companies models in section 2 of YMTU. The sort of investor that the efficient  
market hypothesis states cannot exist. Value investors also intuitively understand that the short-
term liquidity  and momentum effects  seen in  the commodity and macroeconomic models  in 
sections 3 and 4 of YMTU not only make value investing difficult, but also add no value to the  
process of creating wealth that capitalism aspires to.
The proposals of the Aspen Institute were pretty much stillborn for a number of reasons. Firstly,  
because  orthodox  economics  assumes,  erroneously,  that  any  cost  imposed  on  market 
transactions must increase costs to the consumer. Secondly because such a tax would destroy a 
substantial part of the finance industry, which makes the majority of its profits by charging rents  
on the very volatility they create in the first place. And thirdly, and more reasonably, if such a 
tax were imposed in one country, trading would simply move to an alternative jurisdiction.
To understand just how short-term the finance industry has become, it  is  worth noting that 
stock-trading is now dominated by ‘high-frequency trading’ (HFT). In the major stock-markets 
supercomputers  trade  billions  of  dollars  of  trades  in  seconds  using  automated  algorithms. 
Individual bids and offers may be held open for fractions of a second. High frequency trading 
systems are now being co-located within stock-exchange buildings as the speed of light now 
means that companies trading from a few blocks away are at a significant disadvantage.
To anybody who has actually worked in a real company, the idea that the real market value of a  
normal company can change from millisecond to millisecond is bizarre.
It is my belief that Buffet, Shiller, Smithers et al are correct, and that the unnecessary volatility is  
induced endogenously in share markets, causing excessive movements away from real value on 
timescales from seconds to decades.
It is my belief that the decadal movements are caused by liquidity at a macroeconomic scale, a 
problem that will need tackling at a macroeconomic level – this was discussed above in section 
3.0.
Other timescales are much shorter and give the appearance of being quasi-periodic momentum 
effects. Although the evidence is controversial, typical time-scales for the periodicity appear to 
be on the order  of  fifty  and two hundred trading days,  with other  shorter  time scales  also 
present. A system is proposed below that would dampen the fluctuations on these timescales.
The solution proposed is a private-sector approach, independent of government. Following the 
same logic as housing in the previous section, it is proposed to introduce damping with losses 
imposed on early retrading on the lines of those proposed by Buffet et al. This would be done by 
introducing a new class of shares, or special investment certificates, in the companies. These 
shares  would  have different  rules  as to their  trading.  The issuing of such shares  would be 
voluntary, at the choice of the companies involved.
In the same way as housing, damping would be imposed with a haircut of say 10%  imposed on 
anybody who sold a share within the specified time period. The haircut would be paid back to  
the company in which the share is held at the time of sale, as such it would be effectively a 
‘negative  dividend’  on  the  share,  paid  by  the  owner  to  the  company.  The  haircut  would 
automatically be deducted from the sale proceeds. In extremis the haircut would be imposed for 
a period of say three years.
However unlike housing it is not proposed that the haircut on all shares be imposed for the full  
term of three years. This would present great problems for pricing of the shares. If a large  
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purchase was made of a company’s shares this would kill the market in that company’s shares  
for years at a time, which would make price discovery for the company almost impossible.
Instead it is proposed that all shares that have been sold are marked as ‘locked’. This would be 
in contrast to all the remaining shares that would be ‘unlocked’.
Every trading day a random selection would be made across all the currently ‘locked’ shares and 
1% of all the currently locked shares would be unlocked. The owners of these newly unlocked 
shares would then be able to sell the shares immediately without penalty.
Assuming 250 days of trading per year, then this release of 1% of shares per trading day would 
give a half-life for locked shares of roughly six months.
This means that if every single share was bought on day one, and no further trading took place, 
roughly half the shares would be unlocked after six months, more than 70% would be unlocked 
by the end of the first year, over 90% would be unlocked by the end of the second year and 
almost 98% would be unlocked by the end of year three. At this point, after three years, any 
remaining locked shares would be automatically unlocked.
This system would be a compromise between ensuring a haircut on fast resellers, while ensuring 
that shares were continually made available to the market for further trading. For an individual 
purchaser who bought a block purchase, their haircut on day one, if they resold all their shares  
would be 10%, if they sold all shares after a year the haircut would be slightly below 3%, after 
two years it would be 1%. After three years the haircut would be zero.
In these circumstances purchasing shares for value investment would have very little risk as in 
such a circumstance the period would be expected to be a minimum of a few years. Speculative 
investment would be risky, and effectively pointless.
Even better for value investors, it should be noted that the losses taken by the early sellers  
accrue to the company in which the shares are held, and so ultimately to the other shareholders. 
The losses of the speculators are transferred directly to the value investors.
All  of  this  could be simply organised electronically  through the same systems that currently 
manage dividend payments.
Interestingly, although such a system may seem complex, it may actually be one that would be 
driven to adoption by the market. For well managed companies, issuing such shares would give 
direct benefits to value investors, but much more importantly issuing such shares would in its 
own right be a very powerful signalling mechanism to the market. It would be very foolish for a 
company that is  manipulating  a short-term rise  in  its  share price  to  issue  such shares,  the 
subsequent burning of locked-in investors would cause significant reputational loss. On the other 
hand, for well-run companies with long-term investment horizons, issuing such shares would be 
a way of signalling the long-term commitment of the management. This would particularly be 
the case if managers share options were restricted to these shares. Eventually, failing to issues 
such shares might become a good indication of a poorly managed company.
Such a shareholding pattern might form a useful compromise between the pattern of ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ free trading of shares and the ‘European’ model of very long-term share-holding with 
very low levels of open trading.
22
9.0 Improving Continuous Double Auctions
In the previous section I was critical about the fashion for high-frequency trading. In an act of  
some foolishness I would like to look at this in more detail. I do this with some trepidation, 
moving into an area where debate is vociferous and my knowledge is limited. However, despite 
my inexperience, from my naïve viewpoint it appears that the structure of financial  markets 
often seems perverse and appears to be incentivised against easy price discovery and the simple 
execution of large trades.
As discussed previously,  stock trading is  now dominated by ‘high-frequency trading’.  On the 
major  western  stock  markets  the  majority  of  trading  is  done  by  high-frequency  algorithmic 
trading. In these stock markets supercomputers trade billions of dollars of trades in seconds 
using automated algorithms. Individual  bids and offers  may be held open for  fractions of  a 
second. 
This is done in the sacred name of ‘liquidity’, which is assumed to be always a good thing.
The current  data suggests that high-frequency traders  largely  provide their  liquidity  to well-
traded shares in preference to infrequently traded ones. They also prefer doing so at times of 
low volatility  to high volatility.  By definition this is  opposite to the requirements of effective 
liquidity supply, and the reverse of a couple of centuries of defining the role of liquidity suppliers.
The quote from Keynes at the beginning of section 1.0 gives his views of the benefits of liquidity, 
and it appears reasonable to assume his opinion of high-frequency trading would not have been 
positive.
More recently other experienced financiers have shared similar views [Noser 2010], and at least 
one commodity trade body has denounced ‘parasitic’ traders [FT 2011b].
That my concerns are more widely held is supported by the recent decision of Credit Suisse to 
start a ‘light-pool’ for institutional investors. This is deliberately aimed at large volume traders 
and ‘opportunistic traders’ will be specifically denied access to the system [FT 2011a].
My own fundamental problems with high-frequency trading are three fold.
Firstly it is trivially obvious that the value of companies does not change from microsecond to 
microsecond. In fact research suggests that publicly announced information has negligible effect 
on  trading,  see  for  example  [Joulin  2008,  Ranaldo  2008,  Bouchaud  et  al  2009].  In  fact 
information largely comes from large trades by institutional traders, and as Bouchaud et al make 
clear, the savagery of the market means that such large trades now need to be broken up into 
small trades and fed into the markets in a piecemeal fashion, sometimes in periods as long as 
months, to prevent adverse price movements.
This brings me to my second fundamental problem with HFT. In a dynamic, chaotic system, 
reducing the time constant of trades, allowing trades to be faster and faster, increases the speed 
and volatility of short-term momentum processes.
To go to the idea of a traditional market, if I was a customer trying to buy or sell oranges from 
or to a stall-holder, I would naturally prefer to see all the stall-holders displaying their prices 
while I get the opportunity to walk around and chose the best price. If each stall holder just  
flashed a quote for one second and told me to take it or leave it, things would be much more 
difficult for me.
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Finally, and leading on from the above, there is very little evidence that high-frequency trading 
does in fact provide liquidity. The paper by Bouchaud et al is magisterial in its depth, and the 
main conclusions are that, although a lot of shares are traded, revealed market liquidity is very 
low. Like the orange sellers in my example, the short time of quotes makes it very difficult for 
buyers and sellers to move large volumes without changing the prices.
In their role as liquidity providers, high-frequency traders have taken over the role of market-
makers as being traders who do not buy shares to hold in their own right, but simply buy and 
sell to others and make a profit on this trading. Unfortunately the traditional duty of market-
makers to ensure an orderly market, and not to favour themselves over their clients, seems to 
have been lost in the cracks somewhere.
As  Noser  points  out,  there  are well-established rules  for  order  book precedence  in  market-
making and there is no obvious reason why high-frequency traders should be exempted from 
these rules.
As a minimum high-frequency trading needs reforming, with a return to the rules traditionally  
imposed on market makers, including a minimum required time for a quote to be offered of say 
five seconds, along with reinstatement of  the normal price and time rules  for filling orders. 
(Traditionally market order books are filled first by precedence of price, and then by time of 
arrival of the quote.)
This  would allow competition to revert  to that of  price and spread,  rather  than speed.  The 
resultant recreation of meaningful bid-ask spreads, though possibly larger, would be much better 
at providing signalling of liquidity requirements, which is of course the whole point of market-
making in the first place. The increase in price transparency should far outweigh the cost of the 
free options offered.
Looking more broadly, speed of trading, and narrowness of spread are not the only benefits  
required  from a liquid  market.  As  is  seen  in  Bouchaud et  al’s  paper,  high  speed  does  not 
guarantee the ability to trade a large volume. Similarly, a narrow spread does not mean good 
value if the upper and lower bands of the spread move against you rapidly as soon as you start  
trading.
In fact, a good liquid market has a combination of three dimensions, the ability to trade large 
volumes, at good prices, at high speeds. The way markets are structured allows high-frequency 
trading to prioritise the advantages of speed at the expense of price and volume.
Supporters  of  high  speed  trading  show  reduced  spreads  as  the  main  benefit  of  their  
technologies,  with the implicit  assumption that  this  has clearly  reduced costs  for  all  market 
participants.  But  the  reduced  spreads  have  been  accompanied  by  increased  frequencies  of 
trading. It is the belief of the author that the increased speed of trading, and the faster reaction  
of markets to order flow mean that short term momentum effects  have been increased,  so 
obliging all traders to balance their portfolios more frequently.
It is trivially obvious that if spreads are halved, but traders are forced to trade three times more 
frequently, then overall trading costs have been increased by 50%. If the majority of gains are 
going to the algorithmic traders, then costs to normal traders have been increased even further. 
And here ‘normal traders’ ultimately means the general public as savers, and genuine capitalists  
raising money to invest in productive capacity.
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One possible  way  to  manage  this  is  to  change the  trading  rules  so  that  they  also  reward 
providers of volume, longer quotes, and so good stable pricing.
The big advantage in offering larger volume quotes is clearly that more trading can be done 
faster, and at lower cost. The existence of over-the-counter ‘upstairs’  markets suggests that 
institutional investors often want to sell and buy large quantities at the same time, however the 
ad-hoc nature of upstairs markets can make such exchanges slow and expensive, indeed ‘dark-
pools’ appear to be part of an ongoing process to formalise and automate this upstairs market. 
Whether ‘light-pools’ form an extra step in this process remains to be seen.
The big disadvantage of trading large volumes is that it gives a large information signal and 
causes  large adverse  movements  if  only  one side of  such a potential  trade advertises  their 
potential trade.
If  more  bidders  provided  longer  quotes  this  would  give  more  quotes  available,  more  price 
transparency and greater competition. Unfortunately, as discussed above, a long-life quote gives 
a  ‘free-option’  to  traders  who  can  predict  the  direction  the  market  is  going  to  move.  This 
therefore encourages short quotes, which in a circular reinforcement, encourages rapid price 
movements.
It is possible that Credit Suisse, or other organisers of ‘light pools’ may be able to increase the 
effectiveness and liquidity of their trading platforms if they used rules along the lines of the 
following for filling orders against the limit order book:
1. All quotes to be quoted with both a size and a ‘valid-to’ time as well as a price. The 
quote would stand at least to the valid-to time. The valid-to time could be extended, 
or be rolling from the present time, but the quote could not be cancelled before the 
valid-to time, and a rolling quote would only be convertible into a valid-to quote of the 
same length.
2. Impose a minimum valid-to time of a few seconds.
3. Fill orders firstly according to price.
4. Where  offers  have the same price  the offer  with the furthest  ‘valid-to’  time is 
selected first.
5. Where offers have the same prices and ‘valid-to’ time, the offer with the largest 
volume is selected first.
All incoming orders would follow the same rules, any that crossed the existing order book would 
be settled immediately, any that don’t cross would be obliged to remain on the book until at 
least the end of the minimum ‘valid-to’ time.
This would be a ‘no-time-wasters’ market. It is possible that all quotes submitted would be for 
the minimum valid-to time, with small quotes competing on price only. However it is the belief of 
the author that such a market would encourage competition first on length of quote and then on 
volume.
The  minimum  time  period  would  form  an  initial  ‘level  playing  field’  and  would  discourage 
opportunistic bids. Given an existing price level,  a new quote on the market that wanted to 
ensure a sale could simply quote a better price. Alternatively they could put in a quote at the 
same price but with a later ‘valid-to’ time. If the extension of time was relatively short, this 
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second course would probably be cheaper than quoting a better price, especially if the market 
was stable. So at first the market should get a greater amount of quotes going further into the 
future.
With more bids on each side of the limit book, dealers that had large positions to move would 
then be able to compete on volume rather than price. If they did this alone in the current HFT 
market it would be suicidal,  but with more ‘revealed liquidity’ on each side of the book, the 
proportion of new information revealed would be smaller.
This process should allow more visibility and stability in pricing and so better price discovery. 
This could then feed back into more competition on quote duration and volume. Ultimately, if  
this system did work it would have more quotes, more volume and more revealed liquidity than 
other markets, and ultimately, smaller spreads.
The whole point of the proposed system above is to make traders behave more like fruit stall  
holders, or better, shop-keepers; to incentivise them to advertise their prices for longer periods 
and greater amounts of goods, so allowing better competition.
Counter-intuitively, under such a system, much greater liquidity, and better overall price value 
may also be achieved by limiting the intervals in prices at which shares can be traded and also 
by limiting the frequencies at which ‘valid to’  times can finish, say every 2 seconds. Infinite 
granularity would be reserved just for volume. This would be a reversal of recent history in the 
management of stock-exchanges. This would prevent price competition at very small fractional 
levels of price and time, and so encourage more competition on quote time length and volume.
A second area in which the current structure of markets seems sadly lacking is at the opening 
and closing of sessions. Currently this is commonly done by complex bidding procedures and 
crossing algorithms to dictate median prices. The suspicion that these procedures don’t work; 
that the median prices  are not in fact  the market  prices,  is  reinforced by the fact  that the 
majority of trading in equity markets takes place in the first and last hour or so of the trading 
day. Figure 9.2.1 below gives the price (thick line), and volume (smaller grey shading towards 
bottom) for shares in HSBC, a large UK bank. Although the scale is a bit small, it can be seen  
from the volume that the majority of the trading takes place at the start and end of the trading 
sessions. This is typical of share trading patterns.
Figure 9.2.1 here
[FT.com Markets/data]
The  problem  here  is  that  as  the  market  opens,  liquidity  goes  from  zero  to  near  infinite 
instantaneously.  Conversely,  at  the  close  of  the  market,  liquidity  goes  from infinite  to  zero 
instantaneously.
It  is  well  known  that  increasing  liquidity  decreases  spreads,  so  conversely,  deliberately 
decreasing liquidity should increase spreads. This suggests an alternative to crossing procedures.
Opening a market could be managed by steadily increasing the liquidity over the first half hour. 
This could be done easily by opening the market with a very large minimum trade size, in the UK 
market this  would be a minimum multiple  of  the normal market size  ‘NMS’.  With this  large 
26
minimum trade size, bids and offers would be a long way apart, and it is very unlikely that any 
trading would take place. Over the first half hour the minimum bid size would then slowly be 
moved from a large multiple of NMS to the normal minimum quote size. At some point during 
this process the bid and offer prices would come close enough for trading to start. This starting 
point would then be exactly the correct market price. A similar process could be used in reverse 
for closing markets.
Following the ideas above, it might be better to use the length of time that a quote is held open 
as the way of manipulating liquidity. At the opening of the market, minimum quote length would  
be in the order of minutes, and would then be steadily shortened. This would have the same 
effect of bringing the bid and ask prices together slowly, while having the advantage of not 
discriminating against small traders.
In fact, although this process would be very useful for restarting a stopped market, it wouldn’t 
generally  be  necessary.  Some  commodities  markets  have  already  solved  this  problem.  For 
example the oil futures market run by ICE has trading hours between 01:00am and 11:00pm 
(UK time). Again the figure below gives price (thick line), and volume (smaller grey shading 
towards bottom). 
Figure 9.2.2 here
[FT.com Markets/data]
Although this might raise fears of traders being forced to work anti-social hours, actually the 
reverse is true. Trading through the night is low, and then trading and liquidity both rise to a 
morning peak, followed by a larger afternoon peak before dropping off again. Clearly this has 
settled to a standard pattern where people who have large trades wait for the liquidity peak to 
build before they move in to trade.
It would certainly be feasible to do the same for the major stock-exchanges, if only for the larger 
shares such as those in the FTSE100 index.
All the above are the suggestions of an amateur game theorist. Within economics in recent years 
there has been an explosion of literature on game theory and auction theory, but this seems to 
have  had  little  practical  input  to  the  trading  of  financial  assets  in  general  and  market 
microstructure in particular.  The systematic application of game theory to continuous double 
auction markets would appear to be a very productive potential future field.
10.0  Retail Savings Insurance
The following is a proposal for compulsory default insurance for retail bank deposits. This would 
not be intended as a realistic way of insuring the deposits, but as a way of introducing market 
pricing into the risk of government bank deposit insurance. If done correctly this would also 
reduce the moral hazard element of public assurance of bank deposits.
27
Realistically, in a democratic capitalist society, a government run central bank will always need to 
be the lender of last resort and will need to guarantee the deposits of members of the general  
public to a basic level.
However,  such guarantees  remove all  risk  for  all  but  the  richest  members  of  the public.  It 
encourages them to move their  deposits  to the highest interest  payers without any need to 
worry about whether the bank is well run or in danger of collapse.
This then encourages all banks, even the well run, to compete on interest paid while ignoring 
the risk taken. Indeed the well run banks are forced to match the foolishness of their badly run 
competitors if they wish to stay in business.
A way to resolve this is to insist that all deposit-taking banks apply compulsory deposit insurance 
on their deposits. The insurance would be strictly in the form of a percentage charged on the 
deposits, and this would be displayed in parallel to the interest rate paid by the bank.
It would be illegal for a particular bank to offer its own insurance on its own accounts, and it 
would be compulsory  for banks to offer  all  alternative insurance from all  alternative deposit 
taking banks.
Bank customers would be able to swap their insurance simply and electronically at any time they 
wished, from a visible list of alternatives available via the account.
All deposit taking banks would be obliged to offer a price for insurance for all their competitors. 
They may wish to price their insurance at a high level, but they would be obliged to price, and 
would be obliged to take on the insurance at the price offered.
In the event of a bank failing, the insuring banks would be obliged to pay the deposits of the 
insured depositors from their own bank’s funds (to avoid spreading systemic risk, reinsurance of 
this risk would be prohibited; banks would be obliged to carry a portion of funds against these 
risks on their balance sheets).
The central bank would remain the ultimate insurer of the deposits but would only step in if 
there  was  a  pattern  of  systemic  risk,  and  even  then  only  after  bank  shareholders  and  all 
bondholders were wiped out. In the event of a single bank failure due to poor management, the 
other banks, the insurers, would carry the costs by themselves.
Further rules would apply even in the event of systemic failure. Government deposit guarantee 
would apply up to a maximum limit (say £100,000), but this maximum guarantee would apply 
across all deposits for a single person, no matter how many accounts failed at any number of  
banks. The maximum paid out would be £100,000 even if the person invested £10k in each of 
20  different  accounts,  all  of  which  failed  simultaneously.  Similarly  the  government  deposit 
guarantee would only cover £100,000 maximum over any 10-year rolling period.
Individual bank customers would only be able to waive the compulsory bank insurance where 
they could demonstrate that they already had £100,000 deposited in insured accounts.
Although the above may sound complex, it would be trivial to put in place in a modern electronic 
retail banking system.
The net effect of this would be to create a market in retail bank deposit insurance. While the 
Bank of England may have been surprised by the collapse of Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley 
and  HBOS;  the  author  was  not.  The  rumours  of  all  these  impending  bank  failures  were 
wandering around internet forums from early 2007 onwards. Banking insiders knew that the 
funding models for these banks were unsustainable and dangerous.
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Forcing banks to insure each other’s deposits would force banks to price the risk on badly run 
banks like Northern Rock at higher rates than better run banks such as HSBC and Barclays. By 
pricing this risk strictly as a percentage rate, the general public would gain direct visibility of the 
default risk.
Under  this  regime,  a  well-run  bank  might  still  pay  lower  interest  rates,  but  would  be 
compensated with even lower insurance rates. This should make the net interest rate; interest 
less insurance, of the low risk bank better than that of the risky bank. Competition would no 
longer be on interest rates alone.
With the best will in the world, such a system would not be capable of insuring all deposits in the 
event of a systemic bubble. But that is not the point.
The point is; that by introducing effective market based pricing of risk, the general public and 
the banks would be penalised for indulging in the risk-taking that encourages bubbles in the first 
place.
Additionally, the general rates of insurance should act as both an early warning system for the 
monetary authorities and even as a counter-cyclical assistance in popping bubbles in the first 
place.
In normal times, insurance rates for all but the most foolish of banks should be ridiculously low. 
In the event of the economy moving into bubble conditions, insurance rates would start to creep 
up on the riskiest banks. This would then start to pass on the infection, via the insurance, to  
other banks, but at a much earlier stage than normally happens when entering a financial crisis.  
Faced with the obligation of holding more reserves on their balance sheets to cover the deposit 
failure of others, all banks would be obliged to cut back on credit in general. All banks would be 
affected, but with the strongest effects on the worst run and most highly leveraged banks.
Monitoring of individual and overall insurance rates would give the central banks live data on the 
perceived risks of the banks in their charge, as well as the financial system as a whole.
11. Conclusions
This paper does not in fact have strong definite conclusions. The paper was intended more to be 
a  starting  point  than  a  conclusion.  All  the  ideas  above  are  speculative.  It  remains  to  be 
demonstrate that companies do in fact operate as market-makers and that liquidity is a state 
variable. Similarly, while the proposals for reducing chaotic behaviour in housing seem sensible,  
those proposed for managing stock markets may not be practical.
The main aim of this  paper has been to stimulate a new way of thinking about markets in 
economics and finance. This is a way of thinking that is strongly predicated on the view that 
markets are inherently dynamic.
If this paper helps to stimulate new research and experimentation based on a dynamic basis it  
will have achieved its aim.
11.1 Afterword
29
The paper 'Why Money Trickles Up' was researched and written in a little over a year, without 
financial support or academic supervision.
Foolishly, I have gone against a basic conclusion of this paper, and spent a significant portion of  
my own capital in producing it.
If you have found the paper of interest or value, any donation to defray the costs of writing it, 
no matter how small, would be gratefully received.
Those who wish to make a donation can do so by clicking on the Paypal link below:
click here to make donation
(Paypal accept all major credit cards, you do not need to have a Paypal account.)
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